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Most of the world’s poor face large risks, 
which affect their investment decisions and con-
tribute to the perpetuation of poverty (Karlan 
et al. forthcoming). In this context, insurance 
products targeted at the poor are seen as hav-
ing substantial promise, as opportunities both to 
make profit and to improve efficiency and social 
welfare. The marketing of insurance products to 
the poor has faced two obstacles, however. First, 
demand for insurance products is generally low (Cole et al. 2013). Second, insurers have been 
worried about adverse selection and moral haz-
ard, with the latter concern leading insurers to 
offer only basic products (e.g., indexed weather 
insurance or catastrophic health insurance).
Bundling insurance policies with other prod-
ucts, such as microfinance loans, has been seen 
as a promising solution to both the demand and 
the adverse selection problems (see, e.g., ILO 
2013), under the theory that even those who 
derive little benefit from insurance would still 
want the bundled services. Microfinance institu-
tions might either serve as an agent to a larger 
insurance company or offer the insurance policy 
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themselves. The hope is that bundling would 
create a large pool of non-selected clients, elimi-
nating adverse selection and reducing adminis-
trative costs.
Major health expenditures are a significant 
source of risk for the world’s poor that is not 
well-insured, even by the informal insurance 
network that households typically call upon (Gertler and Gruber 2002; Fafchamps and Lund 
2003). Many microfinance institutions have 
therefore experimented with bundling health 
insurance with their loans.
Drawing evidence from the randomized 
introduction of a health insurance program 
bundled with a standard microfinance program, 
we show that the basic presumption that bun-
dling the two would lead to a large client base 
is wrong. We find that a large fraction of bor-
rowers (16 percentage points) were actually 
willing to give up microfinance to avoid pur-
chasing health insurance, and that the major-
ity of those clients ended up losing access to 
microfinance altogether.
The observed client dropout, while discour-
aging for the microfinance institution and the 
insurer, provides an opportunity to observe 
whether the original concerns of adverse selec-
tion are actually a main barrier to providing 
health insurance. We find that the answer to 
this question is an emphatic no: there is no evi-
dence that clients dropping out to avoid purchas-
ing insurance are systematically different from 
those who remain clients, in terms of their pro-
pensity to have insurable health care expenses, 
including covered maternity expenses that are 
most easily predictable.
It seems that insurers, policy makers, and aca-
demics are one step ahead of insurance clients. 
The central issue seems not to be that only those 
who need health insurance would be willing to 
sign up, but that even those who would need it 
are not willing to sign up for it, potentially at the 
cost of losing a valuable resource.
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I. Bundling of Health Insurance and 
Microfinance
In 2006, SKS Microfinance decided that it 
should offer health insurance to its clients. At 
that time, SKS was the largest MFI in India, 
although it has since become embroiled in 
the microfinance crisis. The hope was that the 
expanded product offering would allow SKS 
to leverage its presumed administrative advan-
tage in dealing with low-income clients spread 
across rural areas of India. SKS was also moti-
vated to protect its loan portfolio from the risk 
of default caused by uninsured health expendi-
tures (see, e.g., Gross and Notowidigdo 2011). 
ICICI-Lombard provided the back-end insur-
ance, while SKS administered enrollment and 
the initial processing of claims.
In June 2007, in 101 pilot villages, SKS 
began requiring loan clients to purchase health 
insurance at the time of renewing their loan. 
The typical health insurance policy cost Rs 525 (approximately $13 at 2007 exchange rates), 
which was loaded into the amount of the loan 
and paid in weekly installments along with the 
loan payments. By comparison, the average loan 
amount was Rs 8000. The insurance premium 
thus represented only a moderate increase in the 
interest rate, which was roughly 24 percent APR 
at the time. The health insurance policy was 
intended to be actuarially fair, though SKS was 
prepared to lose money initially on administra-
tive costs.
Due to concerns about moral hazard in health 
care usage, the insurance policy only covered 
hospitalization and maternity expenses. Clients 
had the option of going to various approved 
health facilities to get cashless treatment, or pay-
ing out of pocket for treatment at other facilities 
and submitting a claim for reimbursement.
The launch of the insurance product did not 
go smoothly. SKS initially planned to make the 
purchase of insurance mandatory for all existing 
clients. Amidst clients’ rebellion, it was decided 
that purchasing insurance would only be manda-
tory for new clients or at the time of existing cli-
ents’ loan renewal. Many clients still remained 
opposed to the requirement to purchase health 
insurance, despite an educational campaign to 
help them understand the benefits of the insur-
ance product. Indeed, discontent with the policy 
and resulting client drop-out led SKS to make 
the insurance voluntary in October 2008. This 
unilateral change to the insurance product, and 
anecdotal accounts of adverse selection and 
outright fraud, led to a breakdown of relations 
between SKS and ICICI-Lombard and insurance 
enrollment was discontinued in March 2009.
II. Randomization and Data Collection
In December 2006, we randomly selected 101 
treatment villages from a list of 201 candidate 
villages provided by SKS. The remaining 100 
villages form the control group. Randomization 
was done in our office using stata code, and was 
stratified by SKS branch and size of SKS cli-
ent base. From December 2006 through March 
2007, we collected detailed baseline data on 
a random sample of SKS client households in 
treatment and control villages.
In the baseline data on health status and 
healthcare usage, we see evidence of a strong 
need for health insurance that is consistent with 
previous literature (Gertler and Gruber 2002; 
Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Table 1, panel A, 
reports that SKS client households experienced 
a large number of “serious” health events in the 
previous year.1 Households’ health expendi-
tures averaged approximately Rs 4,670, though 
some households had considerably higher health 
expenditures (Rs 15,600 at the 95th percentile).2 
Average expenditures were Rs 603 for hospi-
talization and maternity, excluding costs for 
transportation and medicines obtained else-
where, which is similar to the health insurance 
premium. By comparison, households’ average 
annual spending on consumer durables and non-
durables was roughly Rs 48,000.
Most clients report formal health insurance 
being unavailable in their village at baseline, 
and very few clients report having formal health 
insurance (Table 1, panel B). There are few sub-
stantial or statistically significant differences at 
baseline for clients randomly assigned to pilot 
villages, as reported in column 4 of Table 1 
or across a range of other characteristics. Our 
empirical analysis focuses on clients’ baseline 
1 Serious health events refer to illness or injury that 
prevented normal daily activities for more than one week, 
overnight hospitalization or surgery, and any health event 
requiring expenditure of more than Rs 300. 
2 Average household health expenditures are compa-
rable to estimates from India’s National Sample Survey in 
2004–2005 (Gupta 2009). 
VOL. 104 NO. 5 293BUNDLING HEALTH INSURANCE AND MICROFINANCE IN INDIA
characteristics, though we also draw on endline 
data collected after insurance enrollment was 
discontinued and clients had the opportunity to 
re-join SKS without purchasing insurance.3
In addition to survey data, we received admin-
istrative data from SKS that includes loan cli-
ents’ entire loan history. These administrative 
data also include loan renewals after the health 
insurance requirement was instituted and after 
health insurance enrollment was discontinued. 
We also have administrative data on health 
insurance take-up in the period when it was vol-
untary (November 2008 to March 2009).
III. Methodology
The empirical analysis begins by compar-
ing client loan renewal decisions in treatment 
3 Of the baseline households surveyed, only 1.3 percent 
were not found for the endline survey and this attrition was 
not differential in pilot villages. We generally analyze a sam-
ple of clients for which we have data in both the baseline and 
endline surveys. 
 villages to client loan renewal decisions in 
control villages. For each client i in village v 
and randomization strata s, we regress loan 
renewal (Y ) on an indicator variable for treat-
ment village (T ) and randomization strata 
fixed effects (α):
(1)  Y ivs = β  T v +  α s +  ϵ ivs .
The coefficient of interest β indicates the aver-
age impact on loan renewal from the require-
ment to purchase health insurance.
To assess the extent of adverse selection, we 
then compare baseline household characteris-
tics for clients in treatment villages who decide 
to renew to those clients in control villages 
who decide to renew. SKS loan renewal in 
treatment villages implied enrolling into health 
insurance, so we estimate whether the treat-
ment effect on client drop-out varies systemati-
cally with household characteristics. Extending 
equation (1), we also regress loan renewal on 
a client characteristic ( C i ) and the interaction 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Insurance demand
Serious health events, 2.521 2.596 2.440 0.141
 previous year [1.922] [1.985] [1.848] (0.098)
Total health expenditures, 4,671 4,899 4,430 423
 previous year [15,104] [18,519] [10,312] (445)
Hospitalization expenditures, 603 653 549 94
 previous year [3,144] [3,468] [2,760] (96)
Consumption of durables and 47,938 47,722 48,166 −774
 non-durables, previous year [50,809] [44,354] [56,811] (2,165)
Panel B. Insurance supply
Formal health insurance, 0.141 0.135 0.148 −0.019
 available in village [0.348] [0.342] [0.355] (0.020)
Formal health insurance, 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002
 owned by household [0.063] [0.069] [0.056] (0.002)
Notes: Column 1 reports average household characteristics at baseline, with standard deviations 
reported in brackets. Columns 2 and 3 report average characteristics for households in randomly-
assigned treatment villages and control villages, respectively. Column 4 reports the estimated 
difference between treatment and control households, controlling for the randomization stratifi-
cation groups (SKS branch and above/below median number of clients within branch). Robust 
standard errors, clustered by village, are reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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between that characteristic and the indicator 
for treatment village:
(2)  Y ivs = γ   T v ×  C i + δ  C i + β  T v 
 +  α s +  ϵ ivs .
The coefficient of interest γ indicates whether 
the health insurance requirement systematically 
shifted loan renewal toward clients with par-
ticular characteristics, i.e., those predisposed to 
have greater insurable health care expenses. For 
all regressions, the standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered by village to 
adjust for local geographic correlation.
Due to administrative constraints, SKS 
decided to gradually roll-out the health insur-
ance requirement to villages between June 2007 
and November 2007. As we did not randomly 
select village roll-out dates, we define a sample 
of clients who had loans prior to June 2007 and 
we focus on intent-to-treat estimates from rela-
tive impacts on SKS client loan renewal in treat-
ment villages after June 2007.
IV. Results
Loan Renewal.—The requirement to pur-
chase health insurance substantially lowered 
SKS clients’ loan renewal rates. Table 2, column 
1, reports that clients in treatment villages were 
16 percentage points (or 23 percent) less likely 
to take out an annual loan within one year after 
the pilot began.4 The pilot’s gradual roll-out 
implies that approximately 73 percent of cli-
ents in treatment villages would have faced the 
health insurance requirement at the time when 
their previous loan expired, so these intent-to-
treat estimates might be scaled-up by a factor of 
1.37.5 The estimated impacts on loan renewal are 
somewhat larger (22 percentage points) when 
restricting the sample to clients in our baseline 
and endline surveys (Table 2, column 2).
Interestingly, this difference in loan renewal 
persisted: even after the health insurance 
requirement had been eliminated, at the time of 
our endline survey, SKS clients in treatment vil-
lages remained substantially less likely to have a 
SKS loan. Based on administrative data, clients 
4 Specifically, clients were less likely to take out a new 
loan between June 7, 2007 and July 3, 2008. Clients’ annual 
loans are repaid over 50 weeks, and we have included a 
6-week period for clients to renew their loan. 
5 Based on clients’ previous loan expiration dates and the 
dates of pilot roll-out, we calculate the fraction of clients 
who would have faced the health insurance requirement 
when their previous loan expired. If clients’ renewal deci-
sions are only affected when the health insurance require-
ment is binding at the time of their first opportunity for 
renewal, then the implicit first-stage impact of the treatment 
is 0.73. We do not observe roll-out dates for 20 villages, but 
make the conservative assumption that roll-out was immedi-
ate in these villages. Clients whose previous loan expired 
prior to June 2007 are assumed to not face the health insur-
ance requirement. 
Table 2— Estimated Impacts of Treatment on SKS Loan Renewal
Administrative data Self-reported
First loan cycle At time of endline survey
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment −0.161*** −0.221*** −0.162*** −0.076***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024)
Control group mean 0.708 0.724 0.541 0.717
Number of clients 14,670 5,366 5,366 5,232
Notes: Column 1 reports the impact of insurance requirements on whether clients took out a new SKS loan by the end of June 
2008, for a sample of SKS clients who had an annual loan prior to June 2007. Column 2 restricts the sample to SKS  clients 
in our baseline and endline surveys. Column 3 reports the impact on whether baseline SKS clients had a loan at the time of 
the endline survey, continuing to use SKS administrative data, whereas column 4 uses clients’ self-reported loan data. All 
regressions control for the randomization stratification groups, and robust standard errors clustered by village are reported in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in treatment villages were 16 percentage points (30 percent) less likely to have an outstanding 
SKS loan (column 3). This difference is smaller 
based on self-reported data (column 4), which 
may reflect measurement error because many 
clients report having a SKS loan when these do 
not appear in the administrative data.6
Adverse Selection.—From estimating equa-
tion (2) in separate regressions, each row of 
Table 3 reports the interaction effects of interest (in column 1) and the sample size (in column 2).7 
Table 3 reports no evidence of adverse selection 
across a variety of household characteristics. We 
do not find greater insurance take-up for house-
holds in worse health at baseline (panel A), or 
for households more likely to experience a preg-
nancy (panel B). Indeed, some of the estimates 
are marginally the “wrong sign,” with less loan 
renewal and insurance take-up among house-
holds predisposed to have greater insurable 
health care expenses. There is little increase in 
R2 from adding all interaction terms from panels 
A and B, and a joint F-test of these interaction 
terms is statistically insignificant.
The empirical analysis focuses on households’ 
baseline outcomes, which are by definition not 
impacted by insurance take-up. Any difference 
between the characteristics of those who renew 
and those who do not would be a sign of dif-
ferential selection. For panel C of Table 3, we 
regress health care experiences at endline on the 
baseline characteristics in panel A (or panel B) 
and report the interaction effect for households’ 
predicted outcomes. The baseline health charac-
teristics in panel A are somewhat predictive of 
endline health expenses or of whether someone 
spent a night in a hospital, but higher predicted 
healthcare consumption at endline is not associ-
ated with greater insurance take-up.
The baseline health proxies may be too 
weak or households may not be able to predict 
whether they will need insurance in the future, 
though this would itself alleviate concerns of 
6 Both our survey and the administrative data may con-
tain data errors, though we suspect the administrative data 
is more accurate than the self-reports. Average loan renewal 
rates should decline over time, as previous clients naturally 
drop-out from SKS, and the self-reported mean renewal rate 
in control villages is higher than would be expected. 
7 The sample size varies across specifications, as some 
households have missing data for some characteristics. 
Table 3—Differential Impacts of Treatment on Loan 
Renewal by Standardized Household Characteristics
  Loan renewal Clients
(1) (2)
Panel A. Baseline health indicators
Chronic disease, −0.016 5,312
 any in household (0.013)
Chronic disease, −0.010 5,312
 any family history (0.013)
Self-reported health, −0.002 5,310
 household average (0.015)
Any household member −0.027** 5,310
 in poor health (0.013)
Any consultation for −0.007 5,201
 symptoms, previous 30 days (0.015)
Any household member −0.015 5,063
 who smokes or drinks (0.015)
Panel B. Baseline pregnancy indicators 
Any household member −0.014 5,169
 plans to have baby (0.017)
Number of females aged −0.002 5,366
 17-to-24 in household (0.014)
Panel C. Predicted endline health and pregnancy
Spend night in hospital, −0.005 4,946
 predicted (0.014)
Health expenditures, −0.019 4,946
 predicted (0.015)
Pregnancy, predicted −0.009 5,169
(0.016)
Panel D. Endline health and pregnancy 
Spent night in hospital 0.013 5,355
(0.015)
Health expenditures −0.010 5,358
(0.014)
New baby, between 0.017 5,366
 baseline and endline (0.013)
Panel E. Baseline economic indicators 
Household consumption, 0.032* 5,232
 previous year (0.017)
Self-reported financial status −0.012 4,881
(0.017)
Household owns business −0.026 5,233
  (0.019)
Notes: From estimating equation (2), each row of column 
1 reports impacts on loan renewal from interaction terms 
between treatment and the indicated household characteristic 
(normalized to have standard deviation of one). Robust stan-
dard errors, clustered by village, are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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adverse selection. It is much easier to predict 
pregnancy than other healthcare expenses, yet 
predicted pregnancy is also not associated with 
greater insurance take-up.8 Thus, even house-
holds with almost-obvious benefits from enroll-
ing in the insurance program did not selectively 
elect to stay SKS members. In panel D, we sim-
ply include these endline characteristics instead 
of the predicted values, and there is no system-
atic association with insurance take-up.9 Finally, 
panel E reports variation in insurance take-up by 
households’ baseline economic characteristics, 
and these characteristics are not very predictive.
V. Conclusion, Discussion, and Future Research
The design of SKS’s microinsurance offer-
ing, while standard, seems to have unwittingly 
created a much larger problem in attempting 
to solve a small one. SKS was clearly success-
ful in avoiding adverse selection in the take-up 
for their product. But what they did not initially 
forecast is that this was because no one seemed 
to demand insurance, even people for whom 
there was clearly value (e.g., young women 
planning to have a child). This lack of demand 
was painfully obvious in the voluntary period: 
29 clients in our sample purchased insurance 
when they did not have to.
Strikingly, a substantial fraction of clients (16 
percentage points) preferred to let go of micro-
finance than to pay a moderately higher inter-
est rate and keep their loan. Our endline data 
suggest that these households did not generally 
substitute for SKS loans with other microfinance 
loans, so their non-renewal decision represents a 
net loss in access to microfinance. The relevant 
margin for client drop-out may therefore have 
been their willingness to pay for a loan, and 
have nothing to do with the insurance per se. In 
ongoing work, we are investigating the impact 
of decreased access to microfinance, and we are 
finding significantly negative impacts on the 
performance of their businesses.
8 Our first-stage prediction of whether there is a new baby 
at endline (based on the characteristics in panel B) has a 
much larger R2 than our prediction of healthcare consump-
tion (based on the characteristics in panel A). 
9 Although these endline characteristics are clearly 
endogenous because insurance could have affected behav-
ior, we will see below that this is unlikely in practice for this 
particular case. 
These data suggest that adverse selection was 
simply a moot concern in this setting. More 
generally, in early stages of introducing for-
mal health insurance to the poor in developing 
countries, worries about adverse selection may 
be counterproductive. There cannot be adverse 
selection for a product that no one wants. It is 
difficult to get people to purchase formal health 
insurance, but “successful” insurance take-up 
through bundling carries risks of fostering  client 
resentment, refusal to engage with insurance on 
its own terms, and possibly inefficient loss of 
another product that they would otherwise value.
And as it turns out, SKS clients were correct 
ex post in not wanting to purchase this particular 
health insurance policy. Implementation of the 
insurance was mismanaged by the partnership 
of SKS and ICICI-Lombard. In our sample of 
clients, few claims were submitted and very few 
clients received any reimbursement. By the end-
line survey, and in our regular monitoring data, 
very few people report using insurance, largely 
because clients were never given documenta-
tion to be able to use the insurance or clients did 
not know how to use the insurance. There is no 
particular reason to think that this was expected 
by SKS clients ex ante, at least beyond the nor-
mal pessimism in developing countries about 
the prospects of formal health insurance. By the 
time the product was voluntary, however, these 
failures were probably quite obvious and could 
explain why only 29 people purchased insur-
ance voluntarily. The fact that client pessimism 
was well-grounded suggests that offering prod-
ucts that do work, and letting people experience 
them, should come before trying to solve issues 
like adverse selection that can only arise once 
insurance actually delivers a valuable service.
REFERENCES
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. 2007. “The 
Economic Lives of the Poor.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 21 (1): 141 –67.
Cole, Shawn, Xavier Giné, Jeremy Tobacman, 
Petia Topalova, Robert Townsend, and James 
Vickery. 2013. “Barriers to Household Risk 
Management: Evidence from India.” Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (1): 104–35.
Fafchamps, Marcel, and Susan Lund. 2003. “Risk-
Sharing Networks in Rural  Philippines.” 
VOL. 104 NO. 5 297BUNDLING HEALTH INSURANCE AND MICROFINANCE IN INDIA
Journal of Development Economics 71 (2): 
261 –87.
Gertler, Paul, and Jonathan Gruber. 2002. “Insur-
ing Consumption Against Illness.” American 
Economic Review 92 (1): 51–70.
Gross, Tal, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. 2011. 
“Health Insurance and the Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Decision: Evidence Expansions of 
Medicaid.” Journal of Public Economics 95 (7–8): 767–78.
 Gupta, Indrani. 2009. “Out-of-Pocket Expendi-
tures and Poverty: Estimates from NSS 61st 
Round.” Unpublished.
ILO. 2013. “Microinsurance Innovation Facil-
ity.” http://www.microinsurancefacility.org/.
Karlan, Dean, Robert Osei, Isaac Osei-Akoto, 
and Christopher Udry.  Forthcoming. “Agri-
cultural Decisions after Relaxing Credit 
and Risk Constraints.” Quarterly Journal of 
 Economics.
